MENDING WALLS

Review of Yoram Hazony, The Virtue of Nationalism (Basic Books 2018)

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The election of Donald Trump as U.S. president in 2016, the British vote in the same year to withdraw from the European Union, and the formation before and since of EU-dissident governments in Italy, Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic had many things in common. All combined disparate grievances, ranging across the traditional left-right political spectrum, into fervent anti-establishment movements. They appeared suddenly, by surprise, with the support of large pluralities (sometimes majorities) of national electorates. There was something in them of the ecstatic trans-European uprisings of 1848—the “Spring of Nations.”

That last identifies the common impulse of today’s uprisings: the resurgence of a long-dormant spirit of nationalism. Each was organized around the proposition that the local national elites (our equivalent of the aristos and royalty of 1848) were really part of a transnational elite, one with its own agenda that ignores, and harms, the interests and values of its members’ own countrymen. And those elites—politicians of left and right, government careerists, mainstream media and entertainers, multinational corporate executives, and academics and intellectuals—have indeed struck back in striking unison. The political arrivistes, they say, are ill-informed populists, xenophobic at best and racist at worst, inflamed by irrational hatred of immigrants and exhibiting pronounced authoritarian tendencies.

And yet there are, within the elites themselves, dissenting academics and intellectuals who are plainly none of those things. They are serious scholars who sympathize with the essential motivations and many of the goals (but not always the leaders and tactics) of the new movements. Their writings are giving succor and structure—and, perhaps, staying power—to the antiestablishment impulses of the day. Examples are The Demon in Democracy (2016) by Ryszard Legutko, professor of philosophy at Jagellonian University in Kraków; Why Liberalism Failed (2018) by Patrick Deneen, professor of political science at the University of Notre Dame; Where We Are (2017) by British professor-at-large Sir Roger Scruton; and Republican Workers Party (2018) by F.H. Buckley, professor of law at George Mason University.
The Virtue of Nationalism, by Israeli political philosopher and Bible scholar Yoram Hazony, is the first book in this literature to provide a sustained theoretical argument for the nationalist revival. It is a brilliant achievement, at once learned and sharp, philosophical and engagé. It is sure to be controversial, and not only because of its pertinence to today’s labile politics. The author’s style of argument is bold and emphatic, and his ultimate subject—political virtue—will be unfamiliar and unsettling to readers who expect complete systematic solutions. I predict the book will grow through the controversies and become a major addition to the library of nationalism.

Hazony’s argument may be summarized in three propositions:

First, an order of independent, self-determining national states advances human freedom and creativity, and manages violent conflict, more reliably than any other political arrangement known to man. The only alternatives are government by local tribes and clans on the one hand and by universal empires on the other; and these have proved vastly inferior on all scores. In the West, national self-determination was recognized as the political ideal from the Peace of Westphalia of 1648 through Woodrow Wilson’s Fourteen Points in the course of World War I and Winston Churchill and Franklin D. Roosevelt’s Atlantic Charter during World War II.

Second, universal empire, the only modern alternative to the national state, is not limited to conventional empires such as the Egyptian and Babylonian kingdoms of the Hebrew Bible, the Roman and Holy Roman empires, and the modern monstrosities of the Nazi Third Reich and the Soviet Union. It also includes present-day “liberal imperialism”—embodied in the European Union and, since the collapse of the Soviet Union, in the America-led “new world order” espoused in differing formulations by U.S. presidents George H.W. Bush, Bill Clinton, George W. Bush, and Barack Obama. What all of these empires have in common is the effort to establish universal peace and prosperity under a single set of political principles that are defined, bestowed, and enforced by a single sovereign power.

Third, since the end of World War II, and with increasing force since the Soviet collapse, liberal imperialism has replaced national self-determination as the ideal government order in the minds of Western elites. Liberalism, in both its “classical” and “progressive” varieties, regards individual freedom as the highest political principle. Its exalted position is based on the concept of a primordial social contract—individuals, who are free and equal in a state of nature, form
governments voluntarily, by mutual consent, for purposes of securing greater personal liberty, safety, and property. This liberalism is a universal creed: it abstracts from, and comes to denigrate, the particular traditions, beliefs, and loyalties that are the foundation of actual national states. Nationalism was further undermined by confused interpretations of the causes of World Wars I and II and the Holocaust, which saw them as resulting from nationalism (primarily German) rather than German and Nazi (and Japanese) imperialism.

Our new political divide, in this telling, is between the liberal imperialism of national elites and the local and traditional loyalties of many of their countrymen. Seeing great dangers ahead, Hazony has set himself to restoring the moral authority and political prestige of nationalism. He is of course addressing himself to fellow members of the intellectual elite, such as the author and readers of this essay, whom he regards as a big part of the problem. In what follows, I will elaborate his central arguments and explain how he has won me over on critical points.

“National state” is Hazony’s term for what is more conventionally termed the nation-state. It is composed of disparate groups, communities, and institutions—originally families, clans, and tribes, then neighbors, towns, and regions, social and occupational networks, racial and ethnic groups, and synagogues, churches, schools, and clubs. They share a territory and a heritage, typically involving a common or predominant language, religious traditions, and civic texts and rituals. They have a history of joining together against common enemies, where in-group loyalties come to extend across groups. At some point, they have become sufficiently cohesive, and have acquired sufficient resources, to establish a government.

National states are not formed and sustained by the consent of individuals—that’s the liberal “fairy tale” concocted by John Locke and other social-contract theorists. Rather, they are formed by the interaction of constituent groups, often under duress, in order to end warfare among clans and tribes, defend against external enemies, and provide public goods such as better resource management and dispute resolution. They endure for these purposes and, eventually, to preserve inherited traditions and cultures and pass them on to future generations.

Hazony is an empiricist, and his account of the origins of the national state accords with those of historians and anthropologists who are not building philosophical systems. And he has the empiricist’s disdain for those who think
human reason can deduce universal truths. But when he singles out the sainted John Locke as a subverter of nationalism, and then takes several swipes at libertarian icons Friedrich Hayek and Ludwig von Mises as purveyors of liberal imperialism, he is spoiling for fights with otherwise sympathetic readers. There are the makings here for some good, productive arguments, but they need to begin with an appreciation of what Hazony is trying to accomplish.

He is a Burkean conservative with classical liberal sympathies—his book is about what political order best promotes freedom, and his views are close to those of John Stuart Mill, whom he invokes frequently. But it is senseless, he believes, to talk of individual freedom in the abstract. Individuals are social animals and, what is more, fraternal animals. We live our lives and learn how to exercise our freedoms as part of collective institutions of intimates and compatriots, from the family outward. We depend on them for our safety, welfare, and happiness, and we experience their successes and failures as our own. If I am free but my wife, children, neighbors, or compatriots are unfree, then, in one degree and another, I am not really or fully free myself. If a town or region in my nation is devastated by a natural disaster, I will support enormous expenditures on relief and rebuilding and may take up collections at work or church.

The groups and institutions that constitute the national state are not organized on the principle of individual freedom. There are elements of choice and consent within families, religions, and ethnicities, but they are not of the essence. For the most part, individuals “join” such institutions by birth, inheritance, or circumstance, and make the institutions’ traditions, customs, and commitments their own through socialization and practice. Such groups could not survive the calculations of individual advantage that are the lifeblood of business enterprises and commercial markets. Instead, they are built on mutual loyalty and group cohesion—a willingness to make routine contributions to the good of the group, and large sacrifices when necessary.

Yet these institutions, Hazony insists, are sources of our freedom. We are more or less free depending on the qualities of our nation’s laws, public goods, and constitutional structure; on its stability and capacity to resist foreign aggression; and on the beliefs, habits, and cultures of the families, clans, and social institutions that formed us and sustain our national home. As I stand at an academic or political podium, bristling with sharp criticisms and smart reforms, it is easy to take for
granted the immense, invisible apparatus that has put me here. Now that you and I are successful citizens of 21st century America or Israel or France, let me tell you about the many egregious and infuriating impositions on our freedoms that ought to be rectified forthwith. As the list of grievances grows, we may come to regard the national state as the enemy of freedom—overlooking the fact that, in the absence of some sort of state and institutional structure, there is no such thing as freedom in any sense a modern person would recognize.

Hazony wants the freedom-loving reformer to focus not on individual but on collective and national freedom, which “offers a nation with the cohesiveness and strength to maintain independence and self-government … an opportunity to live according to its own interests and aspirations.” This is not the end of his argument, but even at this stage it should be clear that he is not trying to stack the deck in favor of collectivist outcomes and is not indifferent to the many obstacles to good policy in developed, prosperous nations. He is concerned that the institutional bedrock of Western freedom is in jeopardy and needs recognition and support.

The rest of his argument concerns his two political orders—of self-governing national states, and of empires of subjugated nations and peoples. Hazony is perhaps best known as a deep and ingenious reader of the Bible, and, as he persuasively shows, the Hebrew Bible is our first sustained history of the national state. The early Israelites inhabited a world of empires and were themselves slaves to an empire. Moses led them to national freedom and, eventually, to their own homeland. God, speaking through Moses, instructed them in how they were to govern themselves as free men and women, in relation to each other and in relation to God. Critically, they were not to meddle in the affairs of other nations: Israel should be governed of, by, and for Israelites themselves, and should strive to live in harmony with other nations.

The Mosaic dispensation did not catch on for a very long time. Christianity was a universalizing religion and allied itself first with the Roman Empire and later with the Holy Roman Empire. But with the rise of Protestantism, the translation of the Bible into many national languages, and Henry VIII’s establishment of an independent English Anglican nation, and then with the Peace of Westphalia in 1648, a new political order took shape in Western Europe from Switzerland to Sweden.
The early modern political construction was built on the Protestants’ close reading of the Old Testament. First, national states were obliged to protect their people in life, family, and property; to dispense justice; and to maintain the Sabbath and public recognition of one God. This was the “moral minimum” of legitimate government, aimed at fostering individual freedom and dignity. Second, national states possessed self-determination: They were free to govern themselves according to their own traditions, institutions, procedures, and ways of life—which would of course vary from nation to nation—without interference from foreign powers.

This was the political ideal in the European and English-speaking worlds for three centuries. But today, following the recent emergence of “liberal imperialism,” it sounds defiantly retro. Take, for instance (my example, not Hazony’s), President Donald Trump’s address to the UN General Assembly on September 19, 2017, which was criticized as if it were an intemperate tweet despite the fact that it restated propositions that were widely accepted from the 17th century through Woodrow Wilson, FDR, and Churchill:

We do not expect diverse countries to share the same cultures, traditions, or even systems of government. But we do expect all nations to uphold these two core sovereign duties: to respect the interests of their own people and the rights of every other sovereign nation. This is the beautiful vision of this institution [sic—he is being pugnacious], and this is the foundation for cooperation and success.

Now the Protestant construction is not a prescription for perpetual peace and does not purport to solve every problem of political order. Its two principles are obviously open to interpretation and in some tension with each other. Nations will form their own ideas of moral legitimacy and self-determination and may come to blows over their differences. Or nations may simply ignore them. National states with no imperial ambitions have frequently been at war amongst themselves over territory and trade. They have flagrantly violated minimum obligations to their own peoples through slavery, oppression of Jews and other minorities, and other outrages. They have even set up their own colonial empires.

What the Protestant construction does do is acknowledge the human impulse for collective self-determination and offer it encouragement and protection. National self-determination cannot be a “right”—Woodrow Wilson’s formulation in his Fourteen Points, which he later recanted—for it depends on (actually it
means) locals with the ambition, resources, and cohesion necessary for effective statehood. Self-determination and the moral minimum cannot be more than guidelines—for if they were detailed and prescriptive they would need an empire to enforce them. But the generality of the two precepts, and the tension between them, are strengths not weaknesses. They direct debate and action to the important questions that arise under an order of national freedom. They are ethical standards, left for their realization to prudence and judgment among and within nations, and to the many forms of influence that civilized nations can exercise with each other and the pressures they can bring to bear on brutal and conniving nations.

Hazony offers a nuanced account of the Protestant construction’s superiority to empire. National states are less violent because their wars tend to be limited to specific territorial disputes and to lack messianic or ideological fervor. Empires may bring peace and order to regions not yet prepared for nationhood—but at the cost of conquest. “[T]he disdain for wars of indefinite expansion, which is both a cause and a consequence of the political ideal of the national state,” he writes, “is so great a benefit that it may, in itself, be sufficient to decide the argument.”

National states have also been more prosperous, stable, and resilient, because their policies are more responsive to citizens’ interests and values and, in return, enjoy greater loyalty and support when the going gets tough. A national state’s political leaders, drawn from the citizenry, will be familiar national types with a recognizable life story, a common heritage and loyalties, and known powers and constraints. An empire’s leaders will be more distant and less familiar. The leaders will regard their subjects’ traditions and culture as secondary matters at best, and the subjects will be directed to be loyal to an abstract thing—to an ideology or icon or the glorious empire itself—rather than to their own history, sacrifices, and customs. In the face of reversals and hardships, or at times when the government or its officials are unpopular, the bonds of loyalty will be weak or nonexistent and thoughts will turn to resistance and sabotage.

But nationalism’s really outstanding virtues are the affirmative ones, proved over the centuries in Europe and the English-speaking world. The principle that nations could chart their own distinctive courses, that there was no single model or hierarchy for government, “set the world free.” It produced a decentralized, variegated, competitive political order—and one that in turn set the individual free: “The development of individual rights and liberties arose only in national states.”
These were necessary conditions for the West’s stupendous achievements in science, art, literature, commerce, and philosophy and in social and political institutions. It could not have happened in an empire ruled by uniform a priori principles, no matter how brilliantly rationalized those principles.

Our latest empire, Hazony’s liberal imperialism, is, so far, mainly an empire of disembodied principles. It is a belief system embraced by many influential people but without a comprehensive state apparatus (it is American military might that makes possible faux multistate governments such as the European Union). Its principles, however, are comprehensive indeed. Historic empires were based on some grand idea or ambition to which self-determining nations posed an obstacle or a management problem. In contrast, liberal imperialism’s principle is opposition to national freedom itself. It is for global harmonization per se, and for Eurostyle piecemeal dismantlement of national sovereignty as opportunities arise.

To see how this works, begin with the liberal idea that men are free and equal and consent to government in order to secure their rights. That idea played an honored role in the American founding, in the preamble to the Declaration of Independence, but it was never a controlling ideology. The Declaration’s cause of action was instead a 28-point bill of particulars demonstrating that the British King was establishing an “absolute Tyranny” in the United States, thereby justifying the states’ rebellion. America became a nation of highly particular and disparate localities, religions, ethnicities, traditions, and institutions, united by its own mystic chords of memory, at once fractious and patriotic and distinguished for pragmatic, nonideological politics. The liberal idea has been instrumental in the American political tradition, but as an ideal or loadstar, akin to the moral minimum of the Protestant construction—a sort of continuing preamble that frames debate and application from issue to issue.

In contrast, liberal imperialism takes individual freedom and equality as an all-encompassing criterion that renders the national state, and its idiosyncratic loyalties and commitments, suspect or worse. The most striking example, and the central cause of today’s nationalist revivals, is immigration. In the United States, many political activists on the progressive left now favor, more or less openly, the dismantling of border controls and unrestricted immigration (“Abolish ICE!”). This position finds strong support among intellectuals and not only on the left. The estimable political theorist Jeffrey Friedman urges that national restrictions on
immigration are “irrational” and “morally indefensible” because they put the interests of fellow countrymen ahead of the interests of people who happen to reside elsewhere. Some prominent practicing politicians have been moving toward open borders, most dramatically German chancellor Angela Merkel.

People with these views may think that the human propensity to prefer one’s own family, community, religion, and nation is weak or incidental. But they must think that, weak or strong, it is atavistic and unworthy—an affront to our common humanity, something to be suppressed or overridden whenever it rears up. As a result, liberal imperialism is more than Locke for moderns. It sees a world of borderless humanity, with every individual possessing equal rights and brotherhood with every other, as the proper, moral order of politics and guide for right policy.

This worldview is a powerful force for ad hoc empire-building, including on matters that have nothing to do with individual liberty or are highly averse to it. Examples are the many EU programs for harmonizing national tax, welfare, and regulatory policies—statist policy cartels whose purpose is to suppress diversity, competition, and innovation. It is also a font of the growing orthodoxy and intolerance in EU and U.S. politics, where expanding categories of opinion, association, and religious practice are being condemned or forbidden on the “human rights” grounds that they are racist, non-inclusive, or discomfiting to sensitive persons or groups.

Hazony’s third and final section confronts the most prevalent argument against nationalism—that it fosters needless antagonism, easily rising to hatred, among people of different ethnic and religious groups and nationalities. His argument to the contrary is a variant of his argument about war and violence: Empires may suppress group hatreds that would otherwise gain traction in nationalist politics, but they exercise and are eventually “consumed by the hatred of the universal for the particular that will not submit.” The centerpiece is his analysis of the European “shaming campaigns” against the state of Israel. Although these campaigns are always focused on a recent alleged human rights violation, their true objection, as has become clear over time, is that Israel is an unapologetic national state—one that unhesitatingly defends its borders, reacts forcefully to military threats, and promotes the particular interests of its own people. (Hazony was, as one would expect, a supporter of the recent passing of the Jewish State bill as a Basic Law. As he argued in a recent column, Israel’s success as a “raucous liberal democracy …
has not been in spite of Israel’s character as the state of the Jewish people, but because of it.”

Hazony’s explanation for the virulence of the anti-Israel campaigns underscores his larger point that universal principles are reliable sources of intolerance and hatred. Israel is a transplant of European civilization, and the last nation to have attained statehood while that was still in fashion (decolonization aside) before the rise of liberal imperialism. Today a number of Arab, Muslim, African, Latin American, and Asian nations are intensely, violently tribal and national—but Europeans regard them (even Iran) as primitive nations, yet to attain Europe’s higher stage of moral maturity. Israel has no such excuse. As a cultured European people, Israelis have no right to exercise the full prerogatives of the national state. Unlike France, Germany, and other European nations, Israel has not joined a union dedicated to the progressive abandonment of national sovereignty.

Despite the recent electoral uprisings against the liberal imperium, Hazony is not sanguine about the prospects for a renewed nationalism. With the growth of markets, affluence, and technology, many of us (and not just elites) live our lives and pursue fulfillment primarily within institutions that are thoroughly contractual and frequently borderless, which weakens our loyalty to the local and traditional. With the decline of family and religion, the new opponents of liberal orthodoxy are often clueless about the traditional and institutional sources of their opposition. One result is that they often fasten on one or the other element of the Protestant construction without realizing that effective nationalism requires both. Thus, “neo-Catholic” human rights activists want governments to observe Judeo-Christian standards of personal freedom, equality, and dignity—but many of them are suspicious of national self-determination and sympathetic to coercive international law. At the same time, “neo-nationalist” political activists oppose the EU and other supranational restrictions on sovereignty—but many of them glorify the national state as an end in itself, oblivious to its religious foundations, moral obligations, and responsibilities to vulnerable minorities.

Indeed, reading Hazony against the background of 2018’s hair-raising news headlines, one is struck by the gulf between the theory and practice of nationalism. Of course, political practice is always rather stumbling and confusing in the moment, but today we seem to be facing larger problems. The new nationalist movements may be like landing parties—they have the single-minded intensity
necessary to gain a beachhead against the entrenched liberal empire, but will need to be followed by steadier, more deliberate forces if there is to be a lasting nationalist reclamation. Or maybe we are witnessing the death throes of the national state itself, with mutual loyalties disintegrating in all directions and many conventions of self-government giving way to angry division. Two years after the national Brexit election, the British government has yet to begin disentangling itself from the EU and may never do so. In the United States, many in both political parties have come to regard the other party as fundamentally illegitimate, and the Trump administration faces a determined “resistance” movement in place of the customary loyal opposition. Almost everywhere, the elected legislature—the official venue where a nation’s tribes deliberate and come to terms, and one of the key innovations of republican nationalism—is losing authority to unilateral executive government.

It is against this background that one of the most impressive features of *The Virtue of Nationalism* comes into focus. It is not only a work of scholarship but also a guidebook for nascent nationalists. A guidebook, moreover, organized around the old-fashioned, unsystematic idea of virtue. The order of national states, the author tells us, is not any sort of logical or historical imperative; it is simply the order we know of from experience that is most conducive to human thriving. It requires, however, that national statesmen understand its principles and dedicate themselves to its maintenance. Nationalism may encourage and reward virtuous statesmanship. For example: The two elements of the Protestant construction are often complementary in practice, because the statesman who devotes himself to the inclusive interests of his own people will thereby promote mutual loyalty and cohesion, which is the essence of self-determination and ultimate guard against foreign meddling. And another: The order of national states requires the statesman to protect his nation’s traditions zealously and also to recognize the traditions of others, thereby fostering detachment, moderation, and respect for minority traditions in his own nation. But statesmen must also be prepared to protect the integrity of the system: They may never give over their nations’ sovereign powers to international bodies lacking the social foundations of nationhood, no matter how expedient this may seem, because it leads to imperial institutions that will coerce others and imperil the nationalist order. These and many other guidelines which Hazony develops and dispenses at key junctures should be studied, debated, and aspired to by nationalist leaders and activists throughout the West.
Many readers will wonder whether Hazony’s analysis and guidelines leave room for American exceptionalism. He does not confront the question directly, but I will hazard a qualified “yes.” He is, it is true, wary of large national states, because they tend to take an unduly expansive view of their own interests, and he notes that “balance of power” doctrine is aimed primarily at preventing any one nation from becoming so powerful that it threatens the diversity and decentralization of the whole order. And he does not hesitate to classify America’s “new world order” ambitions of 1989–2017 as a species of liberal imperialism. At the same time, however, he singles out the Anglo-American traditions of constitutionalism, separation of powers, and rule of law as among the greatest achievements of the Protestant construction, worthy of emulation and adaptation to other national circumstances. Here I spy an opening for Hazony-compliant exceptionalism. When America transplanted aspects of its constitutional traditions by force to Germany and Japan following World War II, it was pursuing its self-interest, not empire-building, and in a way that almost everyone would regard as prudent, successful, and beneficial to the wider world. And there are many continuing examples, such as the protection of open sea lanes, where America’s expansive self-determination produces critical public goods for other national states. Most of all, America is essential to maintaining a balance of power with two other large national states, China and Russia, which would undoubtedly run roughshod over smaller nations and shred both elements of the Protestant construction were it not for America.

And consider Donald Trump’s address to the UN General Assembly which I quoted earlier. In addition to complaining about international free-riding on U.S. wealth and power in trade, UN dues, and other matters, President Trump also praised the Marshall Plan as a pro-national-sovereignty initiative, condemned North Korea, Iran, and Arab terrorist networks in strikingly blunt and threatening terms, and pilloried Venezuela as a catastrophically cruel domestic regime that America and other nations needed to bring to account. This is what the developing “America First” foreign policy looks like, and I doubt that Hazony would object to its essentials. I would classify him as a “foreign policy realist” who would approach every foreign engagement with a skeptical eye and emphasize the overriding importance of maintaining American constitutional traditions, national cohesion, and prosperity.

_The Virtue of Nationalism_ is a deeply Jewish work. This is not only because it was written by a distinguished Israeli intellectual and Zionist who identifies the
Bible as the original source of nationalism. It is also, as I have noted, a book of instruction in political virtue—of recovering lessons that today are “not taught and only dimly remembered”—which distinguishes it from conventional secular political science or philosophy. But most striking is the substance of the book’s argument. Jewish religion and culture are not proselytizing but rather are inward looking—strongly oriented toward family, clan, and tribe, with regular domestic gatherings from solemn to joyous that combine religious ritual with family traditions, and even with its own exclusive language (actually two). It is a culture of self-reliance and mutual loyalty and philanthropy, born not only of scriptural fidelity but centuries of accumulated practice in response to external threats and opportunities. And this fenced-off culture has generated astounding benefits not only for itself but also for the wider world—in science and scholarship; in art, music, and literature; in commerce and finance; in high- and middle-brow culture; and, in U.S. movies and popular entertainment, a distinctly exuberant form of all-American national patriotism.

This sounds very much like Hazony’s account of the dynamics of national self-determination. And if I am right about the parallels, then the book is itself an example of Jewish fruitfulness. He does not draw the analogy explicitly, but he comes close in one eloquent passage, which will give him the last word in this essay:

[F]ierce concern for the material prosperity, internal integrity, and cultural inheritance of the collective makes every family, clan, tribe, and nation into a kind of fortress surrounded by high, invisible walls. But these walls are a necessary condition for all human diversity, innovation, and advancement, enabling each of these little fortresses to shelter its own special inheritance, its own treasured culture, in a garden in which it can flourish unmolested. … Inside, the things that are said and done only within this family, clan, or tribe, and nowhere else, are given time to grow and mature, becoming solid and strong as they strike roots in the character of the collective’s various members—until they are ready to make their way outward from the family to the clan, from the clan to the tribe and the nation, and thence to all the families of the earth. Every innovation that has brought about an improvement in understanding or industry, in law or morals or piety, has been the result of a development of this kind, beginning as the independent inheritance of a small human collective and then radiating outward.